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We study the political economy of social insurance with double heterogeneity
of voters (i.e., diﬀerent income and risk levels). Social insurance is ﬁnanced
through distortionary taxation and redistributes across income and risks.
Individuals vote over the extent of social insurance, which they can comple-
ment on the private market. Private insurance suﬀers from adverse selection
which results into insurance rationing. We model political competition a la
Wittman, with two parties maximizing the utility of their members. Party
membership is endogenously determined. We show that although individ-
uals diﬀer in two dimensions, their preference for social insurance can be
aggregated into a single dimensional type function. We then resort to nu-
merical simulations to solve the political equilibrium outcome as a function
of the distribution of income and risk.
We obtain equilibrium policy diﬀerentiation with the Left party propos-
ing more social insurance than the Right party. The Left party’s equilibrium
membership is made of low risk and high income individuals, with high risk
and low income individuals forming the Right party’s constituency. In equi-
librium, each party is tying for winning. Unlike the median voter outcome,
our equilibrium outcome depends on the whole income and risks distribu-
tion, and increasing income polarization leads both parties to propose less
social insurance. We also compare the political equilibrium outcome with
the Rawlsian and utilitarian outcomes.
Keywords: electoral competition, endogenous parties, Wittman equi-
librium, social insurance, adverse selection.
JEL classiﬁcation: H23, H501 Introduction
Insurance, although being a private good, is often publicly ﬁnanced. As
for health insurance, the OECD reports that for many countries a very
high proportion of health spending were accounted for by the state (OECD
Health Data 2001). According to this study in 1998 state spending as a
proportion of total spending on health was 80% in Germany, 89% in France,
67% in the Netherlands, 67% in Italy, 73% in Austria, and 84% in Britain.
In terms of total spending, Germany spent 10% of GDP on health, France
9.5% and Britain 6.8%. As for pensions, Börsch-Supan et al. (2001) report
that the proportion of retirement beneﬁts coming from public insurance was
on average 85% in Germany, 65% in Great-Britain, 50% in the Netherlands,
45% in the US and 42% in Switzerland.
The objective of this paper is to explain how and why large social in-
surance programs may emerge as equilibrium outcome when voters are het-
erogenous in income and risk levels. The explanation will be based on the
interaction between economic and political forces. We ﬁrst discuss the po-
litical competition model before turning to the economic model.
Classical political economy models use the framework ﬁrst proposed by
Hotelling (1929) and Downs (1951) where two purely oﬃce-motivated po-
litical parties compete to win the elections. When the voting space is uni-
dimensional and preferences satisfy certain properties (single-peakedness or
single-crossing mainly), both parties propose the Condorcet winning policy
which is also the policy preferred by the median voter.
There are two important problems with the Downsian approach. First,
the assumption that political parties care only about winning the election
is bizarre both on theoretical and empirical grounds. On the theoretical
side, Roemer (2004) points out that the Hotelling-Downs model assumes
that the parties are fully controlled by the politicians and that the parties’
constituents play no role in shaping policy choices. If parties were acting
like that, they “would constitute the most massive agency failure in con-
temporary society!” (Roemer, 2005). On the empirical side, the assumption
that parties care only about winning election is obviously wrong historically,
since parties have traditionally been associated with ideologies.1
The second problem with the Downsian approach is that the predicted
convergence of political platforms is not observed in reality. Divergence
between equilibrium platforms is a well documented result: see for instance
Alesina and Rosenthal (1995) and Poole and Rosenthal (1984a,1984b) for the
US, Budge and Hoﬀerbert (1992) for the UK and Hoﬀerbert and Klingemann
(1990) for Germany.
1 See for instance the description of the German Social Democratic Party in Schorske
(1955).
1Given these problems, it is not really a surprise that the models which
predict that the political economy equilibrium follows the whims of the me-
dian voter perform poorly when confronted with data. A well-known exam-
ple is the prediction by Downsian models that increasing inequality leads
to higher tax rates (Alesina and Rodrik 1994, Persson and Tabellini 1994):
the empirical literature does not support this claim (Alvarez, Garett and
Lange, 1991). In a recent contribution, Aldashev (2004) tests three cate-
gories of political economy models (one that predicts that the median voter
is decisive, a probabilistic voting model and a model with policy-motivated
parties) using data from 48 US States for 1984-2000. He obtains that the
data does not support the median voter theorem, but is compatible with the
other two theories.2
The ﬁrst paper to have introduced policy-motivated parties is Wittman
(1973). He assumes that parties are uncertain about the election results
when choosing their platform and that they have von Neumann-Morgenstein
preferences. In other words, they choose policies in order to maximize ex-
pected utility. However, Wittman (1973) does not explain where the party
preferences came from, and makes no attempt to relate them to the voter
preferences. Later, Ortuño-Ortín and Roemer(1998) assumes that parties
maximize the expected utility of their members which consist of all the cit-
izens who vote for this party (i.e., who prefer the policy proposed by this
party to the one proposed by the other party). This was coined the endoge-
nous Wittman equilibrium. Therefore, what political parties oﬀer depends
on who they attract and who they attract depends on what they oﬀer. This
is akin to the idea that citizens vote with their feet as well as in the voting
booth.3
To the best of our knowledge only two papers have studied endogenous
Wittman equilibria. Ortuño-Ortín and Roemer (1998) develop a model
where individuals with diﬀerent income endowments vote over a propor-
tional income tax rate to ﬁnance a public good. In stark contrast with the
Downsian results, they obtain that the expected equilibrium tax rate does
not coincide with the median voter outcome. Moreover, the expected tax
rate is not increasing with income inequality (as deﬁned by the diﬀerence
between mean and median income levels). This approach is thus more in
line with empirical results than the median voter approach. Lee and Roe-
mer (2005) develop a model where a trade union interacts with endogenously
formed policy-motivated parties. The trade union chooses a markup on the
Walrasian equilibrium wage, while parties propose a tax that ﬁnances unem-
ployment beneﬁts. Citizens are either capital owners or workers, the latter
ones diﬀering according to their exogenous skill levels. The paper focuses
2Observe that probabilistic models generate convergence of the parties’ proposals,
which is not oberved in reality - an aspect that is not taken into account by Aldashev(2004).
3See Baron (1993) and Caplin and Nalebuﬀ (1997) for similar ideas.
2on the changes in coalition formation between workers of diﬀerent skills.
They obtain non monotone results in terms of inequality among workers,
with a majority of low skilled workers forming a coalition to support a high
premium over the equilibrium wage only if inequality is either very low or
very high. This result is driven by the non monotone impact of inequality
among workers on the median citizen income, which is ﬁrst increasing and
then decreasing with inequality.
Our objective in this paper is to develop a political model where en-
dogenously formed policy-motivated parties compete over the size of social
insurance. There are two reasons for supporting social insurance. The ﬁrst
reason is redistribution. Social insurance ﬁnancing is usually income-related,
which implies redistribution from rich to poor. Social insurance is also pool-
ing diﬀerent risk levels which implies redistribution from low-risk to high-risk
individuals. In contrast, private insurance premia are not related to income
but are related to risk, which eliminates redistribution across risk and in-
come levels. To accommodate these two forms of redistribution, we assume
in this paper that individuals diﬀer both with respect to income and risk. To
t h eb e s to fo u rk n o w l e d g e ,i ti st h eﬁrst time that the endogenous Wittman
equilibrium is applied to a model with multi-dimensional types.
The second reason to support social insurance is eﬃciency. Contrary to
many papers in the literature which assume perfect private insurance,4 we
introduce adverse selection in the private insurance market. This produces
insurance rationing and provides an eﬃciency argument for compulsory so-
cial insurance.
When voting over the amount of social insurance, individuals know they
can buy additional insurance on the private market. Following De Donder
and Hindriks (2003), we adopt Yaari (1987)’s dual theory of choice under
uncertainty where risk aversion does not require decreasing marginal utility
of income, but is translated into a transformation of probabilities. This
formulation, where attitudes towards risk and wealth are separated, allows
us to obtain insights that could hardly be obtained with the expected utility
model. However, there are two distinct features of this model compared
to De Donder and Hindriks (2003). First, we depart from the Downsian
median voter approach. Second, we assume distortionary ﬁnancing of social
insurance. This produces interior preferences for social insurance and thus
the need for topping up with private insurance.
A nice feature of our model is that the multi-dimensional types can be
aggregated into a single dimensional type function which reﬂects diﬀerences
in both income and risks. Hence individuals with diﬀerent income and risk
may have the same preference over social insurance. Using this type ag-
gregator will prove useful to analyze voting outcomes. We then perform
4See e.g., Blomqvist and Horn (1984), Rochet (1991), Cremer and Pestieau (1996),
Gouveia (1997), and Petretto (1999).
3numerical simulations of the political equilibrium outcome as a function of
the distribution of income and risk, electoral uncertainty and risk aversion.
We obtain diﬀerentiation of parties’ policies, and that higher electoral un-
certainty leads to more diﬀerentiation. Equilibrium policy choices are sym-
metrically distributed around the median voter outcome, with each party
tying for winning the election. Policy choices are strategic complements with
one party oﬀering more social insurance when the other does. This is due
to the endogenous change in parties’ memberships as policy choices change.
The amount of social insurance that the parties choose to oﬀer in equilibrium
depends on the whole income distribution rather than simply on the median
to mean income ratio. Increasing the skewness of the income distribution
leads both parties to oﬀer more social insurance, while increasing income
polarization reduces the amount of social insurance each party will oﬀer.
Income polarization can take either the form of a mean-preserving shift of
probability masses to the tails of the income distribution or increased spread
of the income distribution. We also compare the political equilibrium out-
come to the Rawlsian and utilitarian outcomes. We ﬁnd that both parties
always propose less social insurance than the Rawlsian level. The utilitarian
outcome diﬀers in general from the expected endogenous Wittman equilib-
rium outcome. When risks and income are not correlated, with a uniform
distribution of risks and a positively skewed distribution of income, we ob-
tain that the expected endogenous Wittman equilibrium rate is larger than
the utilitarian level.
The paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the economic model.
Section 3 describes the individual preferences for social insurance given the
possibility of topping up with private insurance. Section 4 presents the
political competition model and the equilibrium concept. Section 5 contains
the results. Section 6 concludes.
2T h e m o d e l
We describe brieﬂy the economic model which is adapted from De Donder
and Hindriks (2003) to allow for distortionary ﬁnancing of social insurance.
There is a continuum of individuals who diﬀer in income w ∈ [w, ¯ w] and risk
θ ∈ [θ,θ] continuously distributed according to a joint distribution func-
tion H(w,θ), with the frequency distribution denoted by h(w,θ).T h e
marginal distribution of risks in the population is denoted by F(θ),w i t h
mean θμ =
R θ
θ θdF(θ) and median θm = F−1(1/2). The risk is the probabil-
ity of incurring a damage of ﬁxed value (normalized to one). Income levels
are distributed according to the marginal distribution function G(w) with
mean wμ =
R ¯ w
w wdG(w) and median wm = G−1(1/2).
Individual choice under risk is dual to the expected utility theory in
the sense that it is linear in wealth but non linear in probabilities (see
4Yaari, 1987). We use this formulation to separate attitude towards risk from
attitude towards wealth and to circumvent the problem that redistribution
of income through social insurance would inﬂuence the demand for private
insurance. With the dual theory, utility is linear in income and risk aversion
translates into a transformation of probabilities that puts extra weight on
bad outcomes and less weight on good outcomes. The insurance contracts
consist of a premium π and a coverage rate δ ∈ [0,1] which is the proportion
of the ﬁxed damage reimbursed. More precisely, the utility derived by an
individual of type (w,θ) from an insurance contract (π,δ) is
u(π,δ |w,θ)=w − π − (1 + α)θ(1 − δ) (1)
where α ≥ 0 is a risk aversion parameter. In words, the individual over-
estimates by a factor α the probability of the bad event occurring, which
translates into the higher weight (1+α)θ put on the residual damage (1−δ).
There are two sorts of insurance. The compulsory social insurance oﬀers
coverage δ and is ﬁnanced through proportional income taxation, with the
tax rate τ ∈ [0,1] set to equate tax revenue to expected social insurance
payout. However, taxation is distortionary with a deadweight loss that is
approximately a quadratic function of the tax rate. Alternatively, with a
quadratic distortion, increasing the social insurance coverage rate requires
to raise more than proportionally the tax rate. In fact the tax rate can be
written as a quadratic function of the social insurance rate. Letting η ≥ 0
denote the deadweight loss parameter from taxation, the tax rate τ solves
τwμ = δθμ + ηδ2θμ (2)
=( 1 + ηδ)δθμ
Thus for η =0 , as in De Donder and Hindriks (2003), there is no distor-
tion and the tax rate is proportional to expected payout.
Individuals can supplement social insurance with private insurance. In-
dividual risks are private information, and insurance ﬁrms only observe the
marginal distribution F(θ). Faced with this adverse selection problem, ﬁrms
separate risk types by oﬀering diﬀerent coverage rates at diﬀerent prices.
Perfect competition ensures zero expected proﬁts with actuarially fair-priced
insurance. Formally, if δ is the social insurance coverage and δ(θ) (with
0 ≤ δ(θ) ≤ 1) is the total coverage for type θ, then the extra private cover-
age δ(θ) − δ ≥ 0 is purchased at the fair price θ and satisﬁes the standard
incentive compatibility constraints. In that case, the utility obtained by
type (w,θ) with the social insurance rate δ and tax rate τ is
v(δ |w,θ)=( 1− τ)w − θ(δ(θ) − δ) − (1 + α)θ(1 − δ(θ)), (3)
where τ is given by (2) and where 1 − δ(θ) ≥ 0 denotes the residual risk.
The necessary local incentive compatibility (IC) constraint implies that no







= αθδ0(θ) − (δ(θ) − δ)=0 ∀θ (4)
The reader can check from Mailath (1987) that the function (3) implies
that the local IC constraints (4) are not only necessary but also suﬃcient to









which, together with the optimality condition δ(θ)=1 , gives the unique
solution
δ(θ) − δ =( 1− δ)(θ/θ)1/α. (5)
Equation (5) suggests that social insurance does not fully crowd out private
insurance, since ∂(δ(θ) − δ)/∂δ < 1, except for the highest risk θ = θ who
gets full coverage in equilibrium. This is because with adverse selection,
the pooling social insurance cross-subsidizes risk levels and relaxes incentive
constraints on the private insurance market. Observe also that private in-
surance is not aﬀected in equilibrium by the tax distortion from the social
insurance system. This is due to the absence of income eﬀect in the demand
for insurance with the dual theory of choice under risk.
Using (5) and (3), we obtain the indirect utility function
v(δ |w,θ)=( 1 − τ)w − θ(1 − δ)(θ/θ)1/α
−(1 + α)θ(1 − (1 − δ)(θ/θ)1/α − δ) (6)
=( 1 − τ)w − (1 − δ)(1+ϕ(α,θ))θ
where
ϕ(α,θ) ≡ α(1 − (θ/θ)1/α) ≥ 0 (7)
is the eﬃciency gain from social insurance for type θ as measured by the
extra coverage evaluated by the risk aversion parameter α > 0.
3 Type aggregator and policy preferences
To understand how citizens vote over social insurance, we ﬁrst show that
the two dimensions of individual preferences (i.e., income and risk) can be
aggregated into a single dimensional type.
Diﬀerentiating the payoﬀ function (6) with respect to δ while making
u s eo f( 2 ) ,w eg e t
∂v(δ |w,θ)
∂δ
= θ(1 + ϕ(α,θ)) − w(1 + 2ηδ)θμ/wμ
6and ∂2v(δ |w,θ)/∂δ2 < 0 for η > 0, so that the payoﬀ function is concave
with respect to δ for all (w,θ).W i t hη =0 , we have linear preferences over





We refer to this function as a type aggregator (Shapiro, 1999) which is de-
creasing in w and increasing in θ.L o w - t y p e st include rich and low risk
individuals whereas high-types t are comprised of poor and high risk in-








Let t ≡ θμ/wμ and t ≡ (1 + 2η)t, then the most-preferred social insurance













for t <t (w,θ) < t
1 for t(w,θ) ≥ t
(9)
Individual preference over social insurance depends on own income and risk
relative to the average in the economy. The utility function is everywhere
decreasing on δ ∈ [0,1] for low-t individuals with t(w,θ) ≤ t, everywhere
increasing for high-t individuals with t(w,θ) ≥ t a n de x h i b i t sa ni n t e r i o r
maximum for other individuals with utility symmetry around the maxi-
mum. Moreover, for interior preferences, the preferred social insurance rate
is increasing with t; so individuals can be put in a transitive order. The
reason is that those with higher t beneﬁt more from social insurance since
with high risk they pay less than the fair price and with lower income they
pay less than the average income. Note that higher risk aversion increases
the eﬃciency gain from social insurance, which increases t and shifts up
the demand for social insurance of everybody. Conversely, the distortion
parameter η is scaling down the demand for social insurance of everybody.
Note also that t = t when η =0leading to δ∗(t(w,θ)) = {0,1}: individu-
als have corner preferences when there is no distortion. Figure 1 illustrates
the aggregation of income and risk into the single dimensional type to re-
ﬂect voters’ preferences over social insurance. Figure 1 has been drawn for





with η > 0 so that t(w,θ)=t and the median type tm satisﬁes
t <t m < t.
[insert ﬁgure 1]
7It will prove helpful later on to determine how voters partition themselves
when they are given the choice between two social insurance rates, δL and δR
with δL 6= δR. This partition is given by the critical type t who is indiﬀerent




(1 + η(δL + δR)). (10)
Without loss of generality suppose that δL > δR, then single-peakedness
of the utility function implies that all those with type t(w,θ) >t ◦(δL,δR)
prefer δL while those with type t(w,θ) <t ◦(δL,δR) prefer δR.T h et h r e s h o l d
type is increasing in both δL and δR.
By the median voter theorem, the Condorcet winner (denoted by δm) is
the social insurance rate preferred by the individuals with the median type,
tm. This coverage rate is the equilibrium of a Downsian electoral competition
game between two political parties only interested in winning the elections.
We now turn to the description of the non-Downsian political competition
model we use.
4 Wittman political competition
We consider two political parties (say L and R) competing for votes in an
election. Parties simultaneously chooseas o c i a li n s u r a n c er a t ea st h e i rp o l i c y
choice. The party with most votes wins the election and is committed to
implement its policy. With two parties, there is no incentive for strategic
voting: each citizen votes for the party proposing the policy closer to her
most-preferred policy. Political parties are non-Downsian in the sense that
they care about the policy preference of their constituency (deﬁned as the
set of citizens who vote for them).
Without electoral uncertainty, the assumption that parties are policy
motivated does not change the convergence result to the Condorcet winner
found in Downs model. This is due to the fact that, to have any impact on
the implemented policy, a party must win the election and thus propose the
Condorcet winner (if it exists), regardless of its policy preferences (see Roe-
mer, 2001). To allow parties to eﬀectively express their policy preferences,
we introduce uncertainty in the electoral process. This uncertainty together
with parties interested to please their members gives rise to the following
trade-oﬀ: by departing from the Condorcet winner, a party decreases its
chances of being elected but brings its policy closer to what its members
prefer.
We denote by p(δL,δR) the proportion of individuals preferring δL to





8We assume that this proportion does not translate into the exact same pro-
portion of votes, because at the time of proposing their policy, parties ignore
which citizens will show up at the voting booth. More precisely, we use the
“error-distribution model of uncertainty” proposed by Roemer (2001), where
both parties believe that the proportion of votes eﬀectively cast in favor of
δL belongs to the interval p(δL,δR) ± ∆ for some ∆ > 0 and is distributed





0 if p(δL,δR)+∆ ≤ 1/2
p(δL,δR)+∆−1/2
2∆ otherwise
1 if p(δL,δR) − ∆ ≥ 1/2
The probability that δL defeats δR is a smooth function of the policy pair.
Party L defeats party R with probability q(δL,δR) and is defeated by party
R with probability r(δL,δR)=1− q(δL,δR).
We assume as in Roemer(2001) that parties maximize the utility of their
constituents. The introduction of electoral uncertainty means that voters
evaluate lotteries, i.e. the prospect of getting policy δL with probability
q(δL,δR) and policy δR with probability r(δL,δR). Parties, who represent
voters, use the same dual preferences as their members to evaluate this
lottery, i.e. they overweight the probability of the bad event occurring.
Since party members by deﬁnition prefer the policy proposed by their party
to the policy proposed by the other party, each party’s members overweighs
its probability of losing the elections. We assume that they overweigh the
probability of losing the election by the risk aversion parameter αp > 0.
Note that the electoral probability transformation is distinct from the other
probability transformation on the insurance market. We thus have a distinct
risk aversion parameter, αp, on the political market which need not take the
same value as the risk aversion parameter α, on the insurance market.
An Endogenous Parties Wittman Equilibrium is a policy pair such that
each party is maximizing the average utility of its members and parties’
memberships are optimal given these policy choices. Formally,
Deﬁnition 1 An Endogenous Parties Wittman Equilibrium (EPWE) is a
pair (δL,δR) ∈ [0,1] × [0,1] such that
δL = argmax (1 + αp)r(δL,δR)V L(δR)+
h
1 − (1 + αp)r(δL,δR)
i
V L(δL),
δR = argmax (1 + αp)q(δL,δR)V R(δL)+
h
1 − (1 + αp)q(δL,δR)
i
V R(δR),









9where the threshold type t◦(δL,δR) is given by equation (10).
The ﬁrst-order conditions for a Wittman equilibrium policy pair (δL,δR)
are
h
1 − (1 + αp)r(δL,δR)
i ∂V L(δL)




1 − (1 + αp)q(δL,δR)
i ∂V R(δR)
∂δR − [V R(δR) − V R(δL)](1 + αp)
∂q(δL,δR)
∂δR =0 .
The marginal eﬀect of a change in the coverage rate proposed by one party
is twofold. Firstly, it has a direct eﬀect on the utility of the party’s members
(for a ﬁxed membership). Secondly, it changes the probability of winning the
election. The direct impact is given by the ﬁrst term and measures variations
in the utility of the party’s members while maintaining the probability of
winning constant. The indirect impact is measured by the second term,
where the increase in utility from having one’s party policy implemented
rather than the other’s is multiplied by the variation in the probability
of winning. Both parties will then compromise between increasing their
probability of winning the election and adopting a policy closer to what
their members prefer, which will prevent them from proposing the Condorcet
winning option.
5R e s u l t s
We are now in a position to compute the Wittman equilibria. We take as the
benchmark the case where the political (αp) and the economic (α)r i s ka v e r -
sion parameters are both equal to 0.1. Table 1 reports the Wittman equilib-
ria when w and θ are independently and uniformly distributed, with support
[0,2/3] for θ and [0,4] for w. Results are given for three levels of the distor-
tion parameter η ∈ {0.1,0.3,0.5} and uncertainty ∆ ∈ {0.001,0.01,0.03}.
For each conﬁguration of parameters, the table reports the Wittman equi-
librium policy pair (δL,δR), and the median voter outcome, δm = δ∗(tm).
Table 1: Equilibrium with uniformly and independently distributed income
and risk.
η ∆ δL δR δm = δU
0.1 0.03 65.81% 17.55%
0.01 50.39% 33.09% 41.68%
0.001 42.55% 40.78%
0.3 0.03 21.93% 5.85%
0.01 16.80% 11.03% 13.89%
0.001 14.18% 13.59%
0.5 0.03 13.17% 3.51%
0.01 10.08% 6.62% 8.34%
0.001 8.51% 8.16%
10The Wittman equilibrium outcome involves policy diﬀerentiation. The
larger the value of ∆, the greater the electoral uncertainty and the more
diﬀerentiated the equilibrium policies. Intuitively, more uncertainty means
that it is less costly for the parties to depart from the Condorcet winner
by moving closer to their members’ preferred policy. For any ∆ > 0,t h e
equilibrium policy pair satisﬁes δL > δm > δR with party L representing
poor/high risk voters who want higher coverage and party R representing
rich/low risk voters who want lower coverage. Conversely, the equilibrium
policy of either party converges to the median voter outcome, δm,a st h e
electoral uncertainty tends to zero. Increasing political risk aversion also
reduces policy diﬀerentiation because voters dislike the uncertain policy out-
come, which forces both parties to get closer to the median voter outcome.
Unsurprisingly, both parties propose less coverage in equilibrium as the de-
gree of distortion η of social insurance increases, since everyone then wants
less social insurance.
In equilibrium, parties propose policies that are equidistant from the
median voting outcome. Given that voters’ preferences over δ are symmetric,
the voter who is indiﬀerent between the two proposed policies is in fact
the median voter, which in turn implies that both parties have the same
probability of winning the election with each party’s membership comprising
exactly one half of the population. Moreover, with the proposed policies
equidistant from the median outcome, and with each party having a 50%
chance of winning the election, the expected policy is equal to the median
voting outcome.
Although this symmetry in the results is clearly linked to the symme-
try of individual preferences, it does not depend on the symmetry in the
distribution of types.5 Table 2 presents the EPWE when the (Beta(2,5))
distribution of income is positively skewed, producing equilibrium policy
choices that are also equidistant from the median voting outcome as in Ta-
ble 1. Comparing with Table 1, we see that the positive skewness of the
income distribution induces both parties to propose more social insurance
in equilibrium. This is because a majority of voters is below the mean income
and beneﬁts from the income redistribution associated with social insurance.
5Roemer(2001, Example 3.2) exhibits the same symmetry of Wittman equilibria, but
in a simpler model in which either party maximizes the utility of an exogenously chosen
representative member. This symmetry also holds for any distribution of types in his
model.
11Table 2: Equilibrium with positively skewed income distribution and
uniformly distributed risk
η ∆ δL δR δm δU
0.1 0.03 82.17% 27.19%
0.01 64.65% 44.84% 54.68% 41.68%
0.001 55.68% 53.65%
0.3 0.03 27.4% 9.06%
0.01 21.55% 14.95% 18.23% 13.89%
0.001 18.56% 17.88%
0.5 0.03 16.44% 5.44%
0.01 12.93% 8.97% 10.94% 8.34%
0.001 11.14% 10.73%
Moreover, the equilibrium outcome depends on the whole distribution of
income and risks, and not only on the average and median values as with the
median voter outcome. Table 3 reports results for the cases where risks are
uniformly distributed as in Table 1, but where income is distributed accord-
ing to a Beta(2,2) distribution. This distribution has the same average and
median income as the uniform distribution in Table 1, but is less polarized
in the sense that the probability mass at the tails is shifted to the center.
Table 3: Equilibrium with symmetric and unimodal income distribution
and uniformly distributed risk
η ∆ δL δR δm δU
0.1 0.03 69.16% 22.7%
0.01 54.21% 37.67% 45.93% 41.68%
0.001 46.77% 45.07%
0.3 0.03 23.05% 7.57%
0.01 18.08% 12.56% 15.31% 13.89%
0.001 15.59% 15.03%
0.5 0.03 13.84% 4.54%
0.01 10.84% 7.54% 9.19% 8.34%
0.001 9.35% 9.02%
Table 3 suggests that when the income distribution becomes less dis-
persed, either party will propose higher insurance coverage.6 This result
may strike as bizarre since a less dispersed income distribution reduces the
fraction of both poor and rich voters, who have strictly opposite preferences.
As already noted, each voter’s preference over social insurance depends only
6This result is robust to several mean-preserving spreads of the income distribution.
We obtain similar results for all symmetric Beta(x,x) distributions of income with x>1
(we report results only for the distribution Beta(2,2) in Table 3), and also for the uniform
distribution with mean-preserving changes of the income spread, as suggested by a referee.
12on her own income and risk relative to the mean values, so that it is un-
aﬀected by mean-preserving changes of the income and risk distribution.
However the type distribution and in particular the median type will change.
Comparison of Table 1 and 3 shows that the median preference δm increased
as the income distribution becomes less polarized.
Figure 1 is useful to understand the reason for this result. Consider that
income polarization is reduced by a mean-preserving reduction in the income
spread (removing the richest and the poorest individuals from the uniform
income distribution). It is clear from Figure 1 that all richest individuals
are below median type while not all the poorest individuals are above the
median type. This asymmetry implies that the median type will increase as
we remove the richest and the poorest individuals from the population. This
will shift up the equilibrium policy choices as parties are equally distant from
the median voter outcome. When the reduced dispersion of income takes the
form of a shifting of probability mass from the extremes to the centre (as
between Tables 1 and 3), then the distribution of preferences within each
party will change with a shift of the center of gravity towards the median
voter outcome. At the same time the median type will increase following
the same argument as for the reduction of the income spread.
Figure 2 shows the parties’ reaction functions (δL(δR) and δR(δL)), and
how they are aﬀected when the income distribution becomes less polarized.
We ﬁnd that reduced income polarization shifts both reaction functions out-
ward, which leads both parties to propose a higher coverage in equilibrium.
It is worth noting that the parties’s reaction curves display strategic com-
plementarity. Indeed, ﬁxing δL, an increase in δR (with δR < δL) will induce
(border) members of party L, who want less social insurance, to switch to
party R. In response, party L will now support more social insurance. Hence
the driving force of the strategic complementarity in the political competi-
tion game is the endogenous memberships.
[Insert Figure 2 about here]
Finally, we compare the EPWE coverage rates with their Rawlsian and
utilitarian levels. The Rawlsian social coverage rate maximizes the welfare
of the worst-oﬀ individual, who is clearly the one with the lowest income w
and the highest risk ¯ θ.T h a ti sδRawls = δ∗(t(w,¯ θ)). Since the demand for
social insurance decreases with income and increases with risk, the worst-oﬀ
individual will demand higher coverage than anyone else in either party, so
we have that δRawls > δL > δm > δR. Moreover, we obtain from equation











for t(w,¯ θ) < t
1 for t(w,¯ θ) ≥ t
(12)
Observe that t(w,¯ θ)=¯ θ/w because the highest risk gets eﬃcient insurance
on the private market so ϕ(α,¯ θ)=0 .I tf o l l o w st h a tt(w,¯ θ) >t≡ θμ/wμ and
13thus δRawls > 0. Equation (12) shows that the worst-oﬀ individual prefers
full social insurance if the distortion parameter η is low enough. Finally,
note that if the lowest income is small enough, as in our simulations above,
then t(w,¯ θ) > t and the Rawlsian criterion calls for full social insurance
since the poorest individual does not contribute much to the ﬁnancing of
social insurance.
We now turn to the utilitarian outcome. The utilitarian government will
choose its policy at the center of gravity of the distribution of preferred







where v(δ |w,θ) is given by equation (6). The ﬁrst-order condition is
∂W(δ)
∂δ
= −θμ(1 + 2ηδ)+E [θ(1 + ϕ(α,θ)],










Therefore the utilitarian coverage is independent of the income distribu-
tion. The reason is that, with the dual approach of choice under risk, the
utility function is linear in income and so all individuals exhibit the same
marginal utility of income. The utilitarian government has no income redis-
tribution motive, and its optimal policy choice trades oﬀ the eﬃciency gain
from social insurance against the distortion cost.
A corollary to this result is that modifying the income distribution with-
out changing the distribution of risks will not change the utilitarian outcome.
Tables 1 to 3 display the same utilitarian social insurance rates, which are
reported in the last column. On the other hand, such a change in the income
distribution will deﬁnitely aﬀect the EPWE coverage rate, as can be seen
by comparing the results in Tables 1 to 3. We now compare the utilitarian
outcome (13) with the median voter outcome δm. Both are equivalent if and
only if








where Med[.] denotes the median operator. It is clear that, in general,
this condition does not hold and so δm 6= δU. However the condition is
satisﬁed in the special case considered in Table 1 where income and risks
are independently and uniformly distributed. The values of δm reported
in Table 1 thus correspond to the utilitarian social rates. This is not the
case anymore when w is not uniformly distributed, as in Tables 2 and 3.
We rather obtain in these two cases that δm > δU, i.e. that the expected
Wittman social coverage exceeds the utilitarian coverage.
146C o n c l u s i o n
In this paper we have analyzed the political support for social insurance
when individuals can buy additional insurance on the private market. Social
insurance is ﬁnanced by a distortionary income tax and redistributes across
income and risk levels. Private insurance is impaired by adverse selection,
which translates into suboptimal coverage rates. Using the dual theory of
choice under risk, we have shown that the multi-dimensional types can be
aggregated into a single dimensional type function reﬂecting income and risk
diﬀerences. Individuals can then be ranked into a transitive order according
to this type aggregator. Those with lower income and higher risk prefer more
social insurance.
The political equilibrium model we have used diﬀers from the classi-
cal Downsian one. We assume that political parties care about policy as
well as about winning election, and that elections are inherently uncertain.
When choosing their platforms, parties take into account both the utility
their members would get from their proposition in case they win and the
probability of winning the elections with this platform. We model party
preferences as endogenous, with the requirement that, at equilibrium, each
party maximizes the utility of its members, and each individual chooses
freely her party membership based on what policies parties oﬀer.
We calculate the endogenous parties Wittman equilibrium for diﬀerent
parameters values and obtain the following results. We ﬁrst show that more
electoral uncertainty and less risk aversion lead to more policy diﬀerentia-
tion. If electoral uncertainty is not too high, equilibrium platforms are both
interior and the equilibrium is symmetrically distributed around the median
voter outcome. In that case, the median type is indiﬀerent between the par-
ties’ proposals, each party ties for winning and the expected implemented
policy is the Condorcet winner. This symmetry does not depend on the
symmetry of the income distribution function, since it carries over to posi-
tively skewed distributions. Increasing the (positive) skewness of the income
distribution leads both parties to propose more social insurance. The equi-
librium policy choices depend on the whole income distribution and not only
on the median and mean values as in the Downsian model. A less polarized
income distribution also increases the equilibrium social insurance rates. Fi-
nally, we compare the political equilibrium outcome with the Rawlsian and
utilitarian outcomes. The Rawlsian criterion always calls for a larger social
insurance rate than what any political party would propose in equilibrium.
The utilitarian outcome can recommend either more or less social insurance
than the political equilibrium outcome.
To conclude we think that the endogenous Wittman equilibrium deserves
further analysis, and should be tested in many more economic situations to
check whether it provides a good representation of the political outcome. To
paraphrase Roemer (2005), “ We can learn a good deal from simulation, and
15this allows us to work with models in which both the economic and political
sides are reasonably complex. These methods have, thus far, barely been
touched in political economy, but I expect them to come into their own in
the coming years.” It would be especially interesting to extend the Wittman
equilibrium concept to more than two parties.
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